Private Law: Prescription by Dainow, Joseph
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 12 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1950-1951 Term
January 1952
Private Law: Prescription
Joseph Dainow
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Joseph Dainow, Private Law: Prescription, 12 La. L. Rev. (1952)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol12/iss2/7
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
the supreme court once more refused to permit the filing of a
reconventional demand for separation on the ground of aban-
donment.7
The only decision not on divorce or separation involved
simple applications of the provisions of Section 13 of Act 228 of
1948 (Revised Statutes 9:433) and Article 7, Section 96 of the
Constitution, as amended by Act 513 of 1948, on appeals and
custody in adoption cases.8
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LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
The case of Antley v. Smith' was an action for the reforma-
tion of a title description. One of the defenses was the liberative
prescription of ten years against personal actions.2 If the time ran
from the date of the deed, the prescription would have elapsed.
However, the court held that the prescription did not start to
run until the date of the discovery of the error, and since the
evidence established the discovery of the error only in 1948, the
suit was timely brought in 1950.
In its opinion the court added "Further, .this prescription
does not run as long as possession of the land is exercised," and
the facts showed an unbroken possession of the property. It is
not clear whether this case requires an existence of both of the
following elements before prescription will begin to run: dis-
covery of the error and interruption of the possession. In the
present case, it did not matter because there was no elapsed
period of ten years anyway. However, there might be some ques-
tion in the situation where there had been no break in the
possession of the land, but ten years had elapsed since the dis-
covery of the error.
7. Bonvillion v. Papa, 218 La. 203, 48 So. 2d 897 (1950). Previous decisions
to the same effect are Bullock v. Bullock, 174 La. 839, 141 So. 852 (1932), and
Williams v. Williams, 212 La. 334, 31 So. 2d 818 (1947), appraised in 9 Louisi-
ANA LAW REVIEW 197-199 (1949).
8. Ball v. Campbell, 219 La. 212, 52 So. 2d 754 (1951).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 219 La. 525, 53 So. 2d 401 (1951).
2. Art. 3544, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
In the case of Douglas v. Murphy3 a new wrinkle was pre-
sented in an old case. 4 After the previous extensive litigation,
the plaintiff had finally acquired from the State of Louisiana the
patent for certain land claimed by virtue of old warrants. Appli-
cation was made in 1919 to have the lands located under the
warrants, but the patent was not issued to the property until
1941. In the present suit, the defendant contended that acquisitive
prescription by adverse possession started to run against the land-
owner from the date of application to locate the warrant. How-
ever, the court held that there was no passing of title until the
patent was issued and, consequently, acquisitive prescription
could not commence until that time. It would have been a little
incongruous to penalize a person for failure to exercise the right
of ownership before he had acquired it.
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LOCATION OF "SHORE" AND "RIPARIAN RIGHTS"
In the case of Doiron v. O'Bryan' the sale of a property
described a part of the boundary as "following the meanderings
of the lake shore ... together with all riparian rights belonging
to the vendor." The dispute centered on the location of the
meander line of the lake shore (Calcasieu Lake) and the scope
to be attributed to the phrase "riparian rights."
By reason of both natural phenomena and artificial opera-
tions, the property involved had been subjected to a variety of
shorelines since 1812. Both of the present litigants had been
defendants in State v. Erwin,2 and the present property was
covered by the holding of that case in which the original 1812
shoreline was sustained as against the State of Louisiana. There
was neither gain nor loss by reason of erosion. The overruling
of this principle in Miami Corporation v. State3 did not change
3. 218 La. 888, 51 So. 2d 310 (1951).
4. State ex rel. Hyam's Heirs v. Grace, 173 La. 215, 136 So. 569 (1931);
and 197 La. 428, 1 So. 2d 683 (1941).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d 628 (1951).
2. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
3. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937).
[VOL. XII
